Repressive PA police trained, equipped by Western donors
7 July 2012
Aliya (not her real name) was one of a few hundred young people who had marched on Sunday, 1 July to protest against police brutality which had broken up an earlier demonstration.
As the protestors started to call for the resignation of Abdul Latif al-Qadumi, the head of the Ramallah police force, the reaction of the police grew more violent. “No to Dayton’s police! Stop the coordination!” was one of the protesters’ cries.
Keith Dayton, the former US Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority (USSC), ended his term overseeing US assistance in restructuring Palestinian security forces in 2010. But the lieutenant-general’s legacy — newly trained and equipped Palestinian police and intelligence forces — remains.
Others have also helped reform the Palestinian police. The European Union runs a “mission” known as EUPOL COPPS (EU Police Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support), for example.
In 2005 — as part of the “Roadmap to Peace” agreement — donors agreed to provide assistance to the Palestinian Authority to re-establish functioning security forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Since Hamas took over the internal administration of Gaza in 2007, the assistance of the USSC and the EUPOL COPPS mission has been limited to the West Bank. The mandate of these missions is to reform the six different, often competing, PA security services and train and equip them so that they can keep order.
Most of the PA’s security forces were only officially established during the years of the Oslo II agreement of 1995 together with the new PA. As the second intifada — beginning in 2000 — grew violent and many of the freshly equipped recruits took part in battles against Israeli forces, the latter made sure that both infrastructure and operational capacities were destroyed.
PA: policing for IsraelToday the situation in most of Area A — the 17.5 percent of land nominally controlled by PA forces in the West Bank — is different. PA security forces patrol the streets while militiamen with guns are only seen on posters celebrating martyrs killed by Israel.
A 2010 UN Development Program survey in the area showed that 52 percent of respondents felt the security services ensured a safe environment (“Investing in human security for a future state” [PDF]). But this new security comes with a twist: the police and intelligence services are also protecting the security of Israel.
Coordination with Israeli security services is a pillar of the reforms. Forces are trained and equipped to react to the demand of Israeli agencies in quelling armed groups. During the month of Ramadan, when many Palestinians try to cross the checkpoints into East Jerusalem for religious reasons, it is now the PA police which screens people, checking to see if they fit set Israeli criteria for a crossing permit.
Many Palestinians and external experts say the developments inside the PA and its security services are worrying. “For sure,” said one international security expert based in Ramallah and who preferred anonymity, “what we have here is nothing compared to the situation in Egypt or Syria, but there are strong authoritarian tendencies within both the PA and the security services.”
Crushing of dissentThis view is reflected in a recent poll among 1,200 Palestinians (“Palestinian public opinion poll no. 44,” Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 25 June 2012). Only 29 percent of respondents in the West Bank felt they could criticize their government without fear.
For now, most of the repression has been directed against political opponents and their armed militias: Hamas and Islamic Jihad and even al-Aqsa Martyr Brigades. The latter armed group connected to Fatah, which is led by Mahmoud Abbas, the PA’s president.
The recent demonstration in Ramallah, however, is an indication that things could be changing. The protestors were young Palestinians, many of them sons and daughters of Ramallah’s elite. It is no secret that both equipment and training for anti-riot operations comes from COPPS and bilateral donors.
Europe’s complicity“EUPOL COPPS supports the Palestinian Special Police Forces (SPF) in matters of specialized equipment and training. The SPF has several duties among the Palestinian Civil Police and crowd control management is one of these … The SPF has covered hundreds of public order events without any problems and that happened in full respect of human rights and police ethics standards,” a spokesperson for COPPS said.
According to Aliya, the specialized police forces only arrived late on the scene of the demonstration; it was plainclothes security officers and uniformed members of the Palestinian Civil Police who attacked the protesters.
A spokesperson for COPPS stated that the mission is investing heavily in programs designed to secure greater accountability from the police and to make human rights a central concern of all its work.
Shirin Abu-Fannouna, who works for the Palestinian human rights organization Al-Haq, said there was a trend among security forces to target political dissenters protesting against the PA.
Providing advice to the security sector under such circumstances is difficult. While COPPS has been upgraded with a rule of law component in recent years, most donors have a hard time monitoring that their equipment and training are not used to oppress legitimate protest.
Officially the six PA security services employ a total of 29,500 people in the West Bank. But the PA also continues to pay the salaries of 36,500 security personnel who have been inactive since the Hamas takeover of Gaza’s administration in 2007. In such a context security sector reform, rather than just being technical assistance, becomes a highly “political exercise” as the International Crisis Group noted in a 2010 report (“Squaring the circle: Palestinian security reform under occupation).
This is especially the case as legal oversight over the different services is weak. The Palestinian Legislative Council has been inactive since 2007 and Abbas rules by decree.
Strange mixtureThe security services provide one of the few job opportunities for Palestinian men without higher education, and political leverage can be obtained by determining who gets such a job in the bleak economic situation in the West Bank. Political affiliations still play a major role, and most of the security services are staffed with members of Abbas’s Fatah movement.
But “identities are shifting,” said the security expert. “It is no longer just a Fatah militia that acts against political opponents. They are willing to act against other Fatah members as well, if needed. We have a strange mixture now, where the security services have become much more professional and technocratic, but where self-interest plays a much larger role.”
The rationale for the PA leadership’s reform of the security services was twofold: first to regain control over the different feuding militias, and second, to take any security argument away from the Israeli government that could have been used to postpone so-called peace negotiations.
However, as the PA leadership comes to realize that the international community is not able to deliver on the peace negotiations, keeping the current situation stable seems to be the PA’s strategy.
“The big question is, what impact can security sector reform have under such circumstances? How sustainable can it be?” asked the security expert.
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